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Abstract
This paper is concerned with the problem of how effec-
tive social interaction arises from individual social action
and mind. The need to study the individual social mind,
suggests a move towards the notion of sociological agents
who can model their social environment as opposed to act-
ing socially within it. This does not constrain such social
behaviour; on the contrary, we argue that it provides the
requisite information and understanding for such behaviour
to be effective. We argue that effective social agents must be
sociological in modelling agents and agent relationships. In
this paper, we show how an existing agent framework leads
naturally to the enumeration of a map of inter-agent rela-
tionships that can be modelled and exploited by sociologi-
cal agents to enable more effective operation.
1 Introduction
Over a number of years, the work of Castelfranchi and
Conte has focussed on issues relating to the social founda-
tions of multi-agent systems. For example, they point out
that the problem of how to allocate tasks and resources and
how to coordinate actions is typically raised only after a col-
lective or social problem or goal is assumed [1]. One of the
questions they explicitly ask in consideration of this is how
society is implemented in the minds of social agents. There
are many definitions of what constitutes a social agent, but
the term is more often associated with social activity such as
involved in the process of interaction. The need to study the
individual social mind, however, suggests a move towards
the notion of sociological agents who can model their social
environment as distinct from acting socially within it.
2 Inter-Agent Relationships
Earlier work on a formal agent framework [2] allows an
explicit and precise analysis of multi-agent systems with a
very basic set of conceptual primitives. In particular, when
an agent uses another non-autonomous entity, the entity
adopts or satisfies the agent’s goals and creates a specific
kind of social relationship, known as an engagement. If
this occurs through direct intervention, we refer to a direct
engagement, to distinguish engagements in which there are
intermediary agents. Once autonomous agents have gener-
ated goals and engaged other non-autonomous agents, they
may, in turn, engage other non-autonomous entities with the
purpose of achieving or pursuing the original goal. These
engagement chains provide more information with which to
analyse multi-agent systems than using engagements alone,
since the flow of goal adoption is explicitly represented.
They represent the goal and all the agents involved in the se-
quence of direct engagements. Since goals are grounded by
motivations, the agent at the head of the chain must be au-
tonomous. A cooperation describes a goal, the autonomous
agent that generated the goal, and those autonomous agents
who have adopted that goal from the generating agent.
These fundamental relationships underlie all multi-agent
systems and provide a means for analysing the interdepen-
dence of agents in terms of the goals some agents achieve
for others. Moreover, from this basic set of constructions,
we can derive a detailed map of the relationships between
individual agents for a better understanding of current so-
cial interdependence. In particular, different situations of
interdependence each suggest different possibilities for in-
teraction. We enumerate the various possible relations that
might result in this view.
The direct engagement relationship specifies the situa-
tion in which there is a direct engagement for which the
first agent is the client and the second agent is the server.
In general, however, any agent involved in an engagement
chain engages all those agents that appear subsequently in
the chain. To distinguish engagements involving an inter-
mediate agent we introduce the indirect engagement rela-
tion indengages; an agent indirectly engages another if it
engages it, but does not directly engage it. If many agents
directly engage the same entity, then no single agent has
complete control over it. It is important to understand when
the behaviour of an engaged entity can be modified without
any deleterious effect (such as when no other agent uses the
entity for a different purpose). In this case we say that the
agent owns the entity. An agent, c, owns another agent, s, if,
for every sequence of server-agents in an engagement chain,
ec, in which s appears, c precedes it, or c is the autonomous
client-agent that initiated the chain. An agent directly owns
another if it owns it and directly engages it. We can further
distinguish the uniquely owns relation, which holds when
an agent directly and solely owns another, and specifically
owns, which holds when it owns it, and has only one goal.
Finally, an agent, b, cooperates with agent, a, if and only
if both agents are autonomous, and there is some coopera-
tion in which a is the generating agent, and b is in the set of
cooperating agents.
3 Towards Sociological Agents
The framework described above, together with the re-
lationships arising from it, are suitable for reasoning both
about entities in the world, and with entities in the world.
That is to say that in addition to providing us with a way of
understanding and analysing agents, agents themselves can
also use the entity hierarchy as a basis for reasoning about
other agents within their environment. Our work enables
an analysis that can reveal opportunities to exploit existing
relationships and how to minimise effort and avoid conflict.
To illustrate this greater reasoning capacity of sociologi-
cal agents, we describe below some examples of categories
of goals, agents and plans (with respect to the models of
the sociological agent), that may be relevant to an agent’s
understanding of its environment.
 A self-sufficient plan is any plan that involves only
neutral-objects, server-agents the agent owns, and the
agent itself. Self-sufficient plans can therefore be ex-
ecuted without regard to other agents, and exploit cur-
rent agent relationships.
 A self-sufficient goal is any goal in the goal library that
has an associated self-sufficient plan for achieving that
goal. These goals can then, according to the agent’s
model, be achieved independently of the existing so-
cial configuration.
 A reliant-goal is any goal that has a non-empty set of
associated plans for achieving that goal, each of which
is not a self-sufficient plan.
For each plan that is not self-sufficient, a sociological
agent can establish the autonomous agents that may be af-
fected by its execution, which is an important criterion in se-
lecting a plan from competing active plans. An autonomous
agent A may be affected by a plan in one of two ways: either
it is required to perform an action directly, or it is engaging
a server-agent S required by the plan. In this latter case,
a sociological agent can reason about either persuading A
to share or release S, taking S without permission, or find-
ing an alternative server-agent or plan. To facilitate such an
analysis, we consider the following categories of agents and
plans.
 The cooperating autonomous agents of a plan are those
autonomous agents, other than the agent itself, that are
involved in performing actions of that plan. They will
need to cooperate with the agent for the plan to be ex-
ecuted.
 The affected autonomous agents of a plan are those
autonomous agents, other than the agent itself, that are
engaging an entity required in the plan.
 The least-direct-fuss plans for any reliant-goal are
those plans that require the fewest cooperating agents.
 The least-fuss plans are those requiring the fewest af-
fected autonomous agents.
4 Conclusions
Castelfranchi’s perspective of sociality arising not
through collective action, but through individual social ac-
tion and mind, lies at the heart of the challenge taken up in
this paper. In it we try to show how effective social action
arises naturally from the way in which a sociological agent
can model its environment. Though such modelling is not
new, the relationships that are subject to the modelling, and
the way in which such modelling impacts on the world (and
agents) around it, offers a way to understand and develop
effective social behaviour.
The analysis is broadly applicable, but the particular
value can be seen, for example, in applications that embody
critical notions of dependence among agents, especially So-
cial Power Theory and its computational counterpart, So-
cial Dependence Networks(SDN). Our work provides two
key benefits: first, it addresses some of the weaknesses in
the SDN model in relation to the ambiguity of some con-
structs such as the nature of an owned resource, which we
have clarified and tightened; second, it balances that ear-
lier work which focussed on the problem situations, such as
dependencies, by considering configurations of solutions to
minimise effort and take advantage of opportunities in deal-
ing with dependencies (through self-sufficient or least-fuss
plans, for example).
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